

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06  
TRSE-00 /063 W  
-----020722 170658Z /13  
P 161625Z MAR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 616

C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 0564

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR MILI US BF  
SUBJ: FACILITIES NEGOTIATIONS: ADDERLEY'S COMMENTS

REF: NASSAU 0484

1. IN MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR SCHWARTZ AND MINEXTAFF  
ADDERLEY ON MARCH 13 FORMER RAISED SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS WEEK'S  
VISIT OF U.S. FACILITIES NEGOTIATION TEAM.

2. HE POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS "FRANKLY AMAZED AT MISS  
SHELTON'S COMMENTS THAT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR COULD NOT  
NEGOTIATE ANYTHING HERE FMR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT." I  
EXPLAINED TO MINISTER ADDERLEY THAT HE MUST HAVE MISUNDER-  
STOOD MISS SHELTON; THAT SHE REALLY MEANT TO INDICATE THAT  
OUR PRESENT ADMINISTRATION HAD DETERMINED THAT THE AMBASSADOR  
(NO MATTER TO WHAT COUNTRY) WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED AS A  
MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION HANDLING BASE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS  
DECISION WAS BASED ON THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS  
INVOLVED AND THE FACT THAT SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES,  
MOST ESPECIALLY DEFENSE, HAD A DIRECT INTEREST IN SUCH  
NEGOTIATIONS. ADDERLEY EXPRESSED DEFINITE DISSATIS-  
FACTION WITH SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT AS HE FEELS THAT THE  
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IS A DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
PRESIDENT AND THAT, IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE AMBASSADOR,  
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HE (ADDERLEY) WOULD BE NEGOTIATING AT THE APPROPRIATE  
LEVEL. ADDERLEY COMMENTED, "THE MORE DIFFICULT YOU MAKE  
IT FOR ME, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE FOR YOU." I MADE  
IT VERY CLEAR TO ADDERLEY THAT I WAS READY AND WILLING TO  
DISCUSS ANY PROBLEM INCLUDING FACILITIES WITH HIM AT ANY  
TIME. ADDERLEY WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO POINT OUT TO ME,  
AND ACTUALLY SHOWED ME, A COMMUNICATION FROM AMBASSADOR

SPIERS THAT WAS WRITTEN BACK IN LATE 1973 THAT INDICATED THAT WE WERE GOING TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT ON AN AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

3. ADDERLEY FURTHER INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT THINK ANY OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING TEAM REALIZE THAT THE BAHAMAS HAD GAINED INDEPENDENCE BACK IN 1973. FOR WHATEVER THE REASON, HE WAS OFFENDED BY THE INITIAL MEETING. ADDERLEY NEVERTHELESS DID ADD THAT HE REALLY FELT ALL ALONG THAT WE WOULD ULTIMATELY REACH SOME AGREEMENT AND HE STILL FELT THIS WAY; HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT "AUTOMATIC".

4. ADDERLEY MENTIONED TO ME WHAT HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID TO HIS NEGOTIATOR, MR. O'CONNELL. THAT IS, THAT THE GCOB "HAS MANY MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN THE CABINET" AND "LIKEWISE THEY HAD MANY MINISTERS OF FINANCE". IN OTHER WORDS, MANY OF THEIR CABINET MEMBERS THINK THEY ARE, IN EFFECT, MINISTERS OF EVERY DEPARTMENT, AND THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO GET THE BAHAMIAN CABINET TO AGREE.

5. ON REFLECTION EMBASSY MAY HAVE BEEN REMISS IN FAILING TO MAKE CRYSTAL CLEAR TO ADDERLEY THAT FACILITIES NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NO LONGER BE CARRIED OUT ON AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AS WE HAD INDICATED IN 1973. IN ANY EVENT IF AMBASSADOR'S PARTICIPATION ON U.S. TEAM IN FUTURE  
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FORMAL OR INFORMAL TALKS WITH GCOB WILL ASSUAGE HIM, (AND WE THINK IT MIGHT) THEN AMBASSADOR WILL BE PLEASED TO TAKE PART. IF DEPARTMENT AGREES THEN OUR RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER OF MARCH 6 (REFTEL) SHOULD REFLECT THIS FACT.  
SCHWARTZ

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY BASE AGREEMENTS, AMBASSADORS  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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**Subject:** FACILITIES NEGOTIATIONS: ADDERLEY'S COMMENTS  
**TAGS:** MARR, MILI, US, BF, (ADDERLEY, PAUL L)  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
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